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Abstract
Technology adoption often occurs sequentially, so that later potential adopters can see the decisions (adopt or not adopt) of
earlier potential adopters. In this paper we review the literature on observational learning, in which people use information
gained by observing the behavior of others to inform their decisions, and note that little prior research has used an observational
learning perspective to understand the adoption of information technology. Based on theory and previous literature, we suggest
that observational learning is likely to be common in adoption decisions. We develop a model that extends existing observational
learning models and use simulation to test the model. The results suggest that following the behavior of other similarly-situated
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1. Introduction
Sequential decisions under conditions of uncertainty are made in a variety of business and personal
domains. People often observe the behaviors of similarly-situated others to aid them in choosing
whether to pursue a course of action. One decision of this type that is of particular importance in the
information systems (IS) area is technology adoption. In the present research we use theories of
observational learning and sequential decision making to develop a new model that extends existing
theory and aids in understanding technology adoption decisions.
Observational learning is one of the most ubiquitous and useful means of decision making available
to humans. Observational learning occurs when one person observes the behavior of another person
and infers something about the usefulness of the behavior based on that observation. A significant
body of research has developed in the area of observational learning, including models and empirical
findings. Research has shown that people use their observations of others to update their own
private beliefs and to take actions (Bandura, 1977), that bandwagon or herding effects occur
(sometimes inappropriately) (Abrahamson, 1991, Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997, Oh and Jeon,
2007), that such effects often occur rapidly (Gale and Kariv, 2003), and that such effects are often
fleeting and can be reversed fairly quickly and easily (Bernardo and Welch, 2001).
Decisions involving technology are especially prone to observational learning because they are
fraught with complexity and uncertainty. Software and other technological components are among
the most complex artifacts humans build (Brooks, 1975). Moreover, the impacts of technologies can
take years to be realized (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1996), so the benefits of adoption decisions are often
uncertain. It is precisely this complexity and uncertainty that make observational learning so
appealing. Because IT adoption does not usually occur by accident, all of the information an
individual has about the adoption decision is consolidated and expressed in his or her behavior. Even
if the individual has very little information or is simply jumping on a bandwagon, his behavior still
consolidates and expresses what little information he has available. Therefore, learners can save a
great deal of cognitive effort by inferring that if an individual adopts a technology, then his personal
information must have suggested that the technology was worth adopting. Thus, technology decisions,
because of their complexity and uncertainty, can be made much easier by observing and utilizing the
behavior of others.
There is evidence that observational learning influences technology adoption both in the laboratory
(Song and Walden, 2003) and in real world financial markets (Walden and Browne, 2008). Song and
Walden (2003) found that subjects’ willingness to adopt a technology was significantly related to
others’ decisions. Walden and Browne (2008) found that stock market reactions to electronic
commerce announcements by firm X on day t were strongly predicted by electronic commerce
announcements by firm Y on day t-1. In both cases, decision makers showed behavior that
suggested they were incorporating the behavior of others into their decision making.
Thus, it is worthwhile to develop a rigorous model of how observational learning impacts technology
adoption and to apply this model to develop insights into observational learning issues. In the present
research, we develop a theoretical extension of the observational learning model of Bikhchandani et
al. (1992). Our extension is particularly useful in technology adoption situations because of (1) the
significant uncertainty surrounding emerging technologies, (2) the increasing emphasis on quick
technology choices, (3) the path dependency of many technology adoption decisions, and (4) the long
lag times between adoption and financial return on a technology. We use the model to develop new
insights into situations in which observational learning is a key component of technology adoption
decisions. Specifically, we make predictions about the impact of observational learning on the
accuracy of adoption decisions, on the relative market share of different technologies, and on the
market share of technologies when those technologies are aimed at different sizes of groups.
We address four research questions in this area. First, do adoption decisions converge? That is, if
there is little information in the environment, do people simply follow one another and essentially
ignore the small amount of information they personally have? Second, we examine the convergence
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path. How quickly, if at all, do potential adopters start following the decisions of others? Third, we
examine what happens when there are decisions that reverse prior strings of identical decisions.
Fourth, we examine what happens when decision makers are put into groups of different sizes and
allowed to observe the behavior only of those decision makers within the group.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present background material on technology adoption
and important theories explaining imitative behavior. We then develop our model of sequential
adoption theory and present our research questions. We then describe our research design, followed
by the findings from a simulation study. We conclude with discussion and directions for future
research.

2. Background
There are numerous situations in IS research and practice in which members of a community make
sequential decisions and can observe the decisions (but not the reasoning) of others. As noted,
research has documented observational learning in IT adoption decisions. For example, when asked
to evaluate peer-to-peer file sharing technologies, people indicate a higher intention to adopt the
technologies if they observe others adopting them even after controlling for network size (Song and
Walden, 2003). Research has also shown that observational learning is even more important than
professional product reviews for explaining online software downloading (Duan et al., 2009). In the
domain of online auctions, individuals place bids in time order and can observe the bids of others but
not the reasons for the bids. Research shows that bidders make use of observational learning in this
situation, so that in two identical auctions (same product, same seller, and same time), people prefer
to bid for the product for which others are bidding (Dholakia and Soltysinski, 2004). Purchasing
decisions for e-commerce initiatives in financial markets represent another example in which
individuals can see bids (and offers) over time, but not the reasons for those bids and offers. There is
evidence that the prices investors are willing to pay for firms pursuing electronic commerce initiatives
depend heavily on the willingness of others to pay for prior electronic commerce initiatives (Walden
and Browne, 2008).
One of the findings of IT adoption research is that adopters often adopt a technology en masse (Li,
2004). A variety of reasons exist for why many people might make the same decision. First, it might
simply be an obviously good decision; for example, adopting the telephone was superior to traveling
long distances to communicate a message or sending it via the pony express (at least for many
messages). Similarly, computers are both faster and more accurate (and currently less expensive)
than human payroll calculators, so many firms use computers to calculate payroll. If a clearly good
technology choice presents itself, then we would expect it to be adopted. In such cases, the good
choice explanation focuses on the relative value of choices to individuals, and may or may not make
reference to the behavior of others. Sometimes this explanation is satisfactory, but other times the
behavior of others is particularly salient.
The behavior of others is relevant when acting similarly to others offers some type of benefit. Thus, a
second reason that people may make the same decision is that firms may gain social benefits from
following the behaviors of other firms. The notion is that a firm that is like other firms is better able to
navigate its institutional environment. In such cases, there may be no intrinsic benefit, only social
benefit. That is, in the absence of pressure from other firms (e.g., Wal-Mart mandating its suppliers to
adopt radio frequency ID tags), the decision is not necessarily “good” from a rational point of view. In
fact, IT researchers have found that managers “replicate the selection decisions of other firms even if
they believe the copied choices to be inferior or suboptimal” (Tingling and Parent, 2003, p. 114). This
explanation focuses on norms and social pressures rather than on the intrinsic benefits of the
technology itself.1
An important theory for examining situations in which the behavior of others is relevant is network
effects theory (Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Katz and Shapiro, 1986). Network effects occur when the
value of belonging to a network is a function of the number of others who belong to the same network.
1

A closely related field of inquiry is heterogeneous diffusion models (Greve 1995; Greve, H. R., D. Strang, and N. B.
Tuma 1995). These models provide an empirical method of estimation for social diffusion processes.
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This is usually applied to technology adoption by noting that the technology gives access to the
network. Good examples include fax machines (Economides and Himmelberg, 1995), computing
networks such as BITNET (Gurbaxani, 1990), and ATM networks (Kauffman et al., 2000). In this case,
the behavior of others matters because when others join the network by adopting the technology, it
increases the value of the technology. This theory focuses on the value of the technology, and the
only uncertainty is how others will behave in the future.
Observational learning literature offers another perspective on mass convergence toward a
technology. Observational learning suggests that people can augment their own incomplete
information by observing the behavior of others. For example, one can learn about a technology by
observing others’ technology adoption behaviors. It is worth noting that this point of view can
supplement the other explanations discussed above. For example, when a person sees others
adopting a technology, he might think, “If I adopt that technology then others will like me” or “If I adopt
that technology then I can interact with others.” However, the observational learning perspective
adds the possibility that the person may think, “If others are adopting it, then I should conclude its
inherent value is higher than I previously thought.” This is similar to mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983) in the strategic management literature.
Information cascade theory (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) was developed to explain the consequences
of learning from the behavior of others and is particularly useful in the present research. The
underlying notion is that individuals each hold some private information that can be thought of as a
signal about the utility of a course of action. The signals are not perfect, so individuals must make
their decisions under uncertainty. The decisions, but not the signals, are observable by other decision
makers who then use Bayesian updating to revise their beliefs about the appropriate course of action.
Information cascade theory has been demonstrated in various laboratory experiments. For example
(Anderson, 2001, Anderson and Holt, 1996, Anderson and Holt, 1997), experimenters have presented
subjects with an opaque container that either holds two red balls and one green ball or two green
balls and one red ball. The subject’s task is to decide whether the container from which he is
sampling is the two red-one green container or the two green-one red container. Each subject is
allowed to privately draw and view a single ball, representing his private information, from the
container. Clearly, the color of the ball is a signal about the total content of the container. The subject
then replaces the ball and calls out his decision about the contents of the container so that other
subjects can hear it. The next subject repeats the procedure and makes a decision based upon both
the color of the ball he observes and (presumably) the decision(s) of the prior subject(s).
Based on the key assumptions of uncertainty about the value of a technology, private information,
observability of prior decisions, and rationality in the form of Bayesian updating, several results
emerge from these experiments. The first is the tendency of decision makers to “herd.” Herding
means that all decision makers rapidly converge toward the same decision simply because they saw
others make that decision. One might imagine a flock of birds or a school of fish that all turn right at
the same time following the lead bird or fish. This herding is called an information cascade because
the information contained in the decision of the first decision maker propagates to other decision
makers who observe him.
A second key result is that information cascades are fragile. This means that it is relatively easy to
change the emergent behavior of the group by introducing just a small piece of new information. This
occurs because the entire group’s decisions are based on the relatively little information encapsulated
in the behavior of the first few decision makers. In the container game described above, if the first
two decision makers indicate they think they are dealing with the container that contains two red balls,
then the third decision maker should rationally concur even if he draws a green ball. If two subjects
see red and one sees green then the correct answer is most likely red. In this case, there is no
information in the decision of the third subject, and the fourth subject faces exactly the same
information environment as the third. Thus, he must rationally say “red” regardless of his own private
information. The cascade is fragile because every person knows that he is deciding based on very
little information, and it does not take a great deal of contradictory information to change his mind.
The result is that the group as a whole seems flighty—rapidly achieving conformity and then easily
reversing its decisions when small amounts of contradictory information are presented—even though
each individual is behaving in a fully rational manner.
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Information cascade theory provides a complement to the other theories suggested above because
the causal process is different. Decision makers follow each other to aggregate information in an
uncertain environment. Thus, information cascade theory can explain situations that do not fit the
assumptions of the other theories. It can explain situations in which the benefit of a decision does not
depend on the number of others making the same decision, or when a particular decision does not
lead to legitimacy, or when people have different and limited information. The theory seems
particularly suited to the early stages of technology adoption, when there are not enough adopters for
network effects to be relevant or future network sizes to be estimated. Further, at this stage there
may be too few people making the adoption decision for the technology to be popular enough to
precipitate social benefit-based behavior. Of course, in the early stages of adoption, information is
poor and decision makers may have very different signals about the utility of a course of action.
Information cascade theory can also complement other theories in later stages of adoption and in
situations in which the assumptions of the other theories hold. Nothing forbids decision makers from
both inferring information and deriving benefits from the decisions of others.
In the present research, we enhance the applicability of information cascade theory to IT adoption by
developing a more general model of the phenomenon that can be used to develop novel insights. As
noted above, there are reasons for exhibiting similar behavior in addition to observational learning.
Our model represents an intermediate step between Bikhchandani et al.’s (1992) model and a grand
unified model that includes information cascades, network effects, and social benefit-based herding.
We accomplish this by expanding the nature of the signal decision makers receive from the
environment, so that network effects, social benefit-based herding, and other effects may be included
in the signal. Thus, our model illustrates how researchers can expand the nature of the signal to
include other factors that might be important to the adoption decision and is a step in the process
from reductionism to holism.
In addition, we are able to investigate important IT-related questions. In particular, IT adoption is
often of interest from the point of view of the seller of IT, and the questions the seller might ask
concern how to influence the system rather than how the system will behave. To this end, we
investigate the finite steps in the adoption path rather than the adoption equilibrium that occurs in the
limit. Because prior work in this area has been from an economics perspective, it has focused on the
limiting equilibrium, minimizing the consideration of the path adopters might follow to reach the
equilibrium. For IT adoption in particular, the path adopters follow is a serious consideration for two
reasons. First, there is often a finite number of adopters, so it is not clear that asymptotic results are
generalizable. Second, technology changes very rapidly, so it is not clear there is time to reach a
stable equilibrium.
Bikhchandani et al.’s (1992) model, with its focus on binary signals, provides an excellent example of
the problem and its limits but is too coarse to give a good illustration of the finite sample properties. In
particular, their model says that if two people adopt a product or technology, then everyone else will
also adopt. In contrast, our model allows us to understand the change in probability if two people
adopt as well as the rate of convergence of probability (Bikhchandani et al.’s (1992) model only
allows probabilities of 0 percent, 50 percent, or 100 percent, which is useful for theoretical illustration
but less useful for real world applications). Similarly, Smith and Sørensen (2000) highlight this point
when they state about their own article, “This paper is unified by two natural questions: (i) What are
the robust long-run outcomes of learning in a sequential entry model with observed actions? (ii) Do
we in fact settle on any one?” (p. 372). In the present research, on the other hand, we are very
concerned about the short-run outcomes.
Finally, we ask a question that Bikhchandani et al. (1992) could have answered, but did not ask. We
ask what happens if an IT vendor splits adopters into different subgroups and how such groupings
impact the vendor’s risk (i.e., the variance of adoption). Other models have only been interested in
what happens in the limit, and so have never considered how splitting a finite number of adopters into
smaller subgroups might change the dynamics of the system.
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3. Model
Our goal is to produce a rigorous mathematical model of information cascades that can be applied by
IT researchers. Information cascade theory is not very amenable to direct application, and making
minor changes is not a trivial task. We believe this has retarded the growth of this very important
aspect of adoption. Thus, we aim to create a model that is both deployable and easily adjustable.
Our model makes various simplifying assumptions, which we detail below. The model is valid to the
extent that the assumptions either mirror reality or do not make a significant difference in this context.
Moreover, these assumptions give researchers a starting point for adjusting the model to fit different
circumstances. The assumptions are as follows:
Assumption #1: Decision makers must choose between adoption of two technologies called A and B.
Some examples might include PC or Macintosh, open source or proprietary software, or peer-to-peer
or mainframe computers. The model might also represent a choice between adoption and the status
quo (i.e., no adoption). The limitation of this assumption is that it only considers two choices, even
though some situations will, of course, contain many choices.
Assumption #2: Decision makers have some private information about the relative merits of A and B.
Specifically, decision makers receive a signal, which is a single observation from a random normal
distribution representing the difference between A and B. If A is the better choice, then the random
distribution will have a greater mean than if B is the better choice. The decision maker’s problem is to
decide from which distribution the signal came and, hence, which technology is the better choice.
By “signal” we mean the overall perception a decision maker has about the merits of a technology.
We characterize it as a number for the sake of simplicity, but it is, in fact, a pattern of neural activation
based on the information available to the decision maker and the decision maker’s specific
knowledge.
For technology adoption, there is usually no shortage of information; in fact, the opposite is true.
Given the vast amounts of information available today, whether from the Internet or myriad other
sources, it is safe to assume that different decision makers receive different information. For example,
receiving information about an SAP product from the SAP company is probably different from
receiving it from an SAP consultant, which is different from receiving it from the representative of a
company with a competing product. However, even if two decision makers receive the same
information about the technologies in question, they still may interpret it differently because of their
knowledge bases. In other words, two people sitting in the same room receiving the same
information from the same person at the same time about the same technology may have two very
different perceptions about the technology. For instance, if one decision maker knows the speaker
works for the company and the other thinks the speaker is an independent researcher, then the two
will reasonably have different perceptions of the information they receive.
Representing the precise nature of a signal, either mathematically or psychologically, is essentially
impossible due to its complexity. For the sake of simplicity, and following standard research practice,
we assume it can be compressed into a single number. This number is a measure of the relative
values of the two choices. We can think of this value as the answer to the question, “How confident
are you that A is better?” A signal such as “A is much better than B” is an extreme private signal that
is an endorsement for A (although choosing A still may be wrong). A signal such as “A is a little better
than B” is a small endorsement for A, and choosing A is more likely to be wrong than with the first
signal.
Thus, we define a signal as an overall evaluation of the relative merits of a technology based on all
the information the decision maker has accessed and all the knowledge he possesses. It may
include demos, sales pitches, cost benefit analysis, prior experience with similar technologies,
magazine articles, or any other sources of information that decision makers use. A signal reflects the
personal interpretation of all the information by the decision maker.
Assumption #3: The values of the technologies do not vary across decision makers. Either A is
better or B is better for all individuals. In some situations this assumption clearly will not hold, but in
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many situations it will hold to some degree. The benefits of a technology to a specific adopter are
often correlated with the benefits of the technology to other adopters. Technologies perform some
function and adopters usually adopt them with that function in mind. Moreover, people looking for
some functionality are probably facing similar problems with similar constraints and capabilities. Thus,
a technology that works well within one adopter’s constraints and capabilities probably works well
within other adopters’ constraints and capabilities. For example, people frequently need to search for
information online or type memos or visualize numbers, and thus benefit from search engines, word
processors, and spreadsheets. More specifically, people may be familiar with a certain menu layout
in a word processor and, thus, may benefit more from using WordPerfect than Word (or vice versa).
To the degree that people’s relative values for technology are correlated, the model we present is
valid. We assume perfect correlation, but relaxing the assumption does not change the implications
of the model. Imperfect correlation could be modeled as a discount factor on the information of
others, which has grounding in psychological research (Yaniv, 2004). Such a discount value for
imperfect correlation simply makes decision makers’ responses to others’ decisions less dramatic.
We note that in cases in which each decision maker’s valuation for the two technologies is
uncorrelated, there is no information to be gained from observing the behavior of others. Thus, the
model does not address those situations.
Assumption #4: The perceived costs and benefits of making a correct or incorrect decision do not
change during the adoption period, and they are identical for all decision makers. In other words,
decision makers are homogeneous. This is a simplifying assumption (made to keep a variable called
k constant) and a limitation of this work. The decision a person makes should depend not only on the
probability of being correct, but on the benefit of being correct and the cost of being wrong. Thus,
decision makers must evaluate the cost of choosing B when A is actually correct and vice versa, the
benefit of choosing A when A is correct, and the benefit of choosing B when B is correct. We assume
these values are constant across decisions.
Assumption #5: The distributions from which decision makers receive private signals do not change.
In most cases, over time, more information about the relative merits of technologies becomes
available to all decision makers, which may change their private evaluations. For example, decision
makers’ perspectives on electronic commerce technology have changed dramatically over the last
decade, and it is unreasonable to believe that current decision makers would receive private signals
about electronic commerce from the same distributions as did decision makers in the late 1990s.
However, over a short period of time, distributions can remain relatively static. Certainly, those who
have adopted will begin receiving information relatively rapidly, but they will have no incentive to
share the information about the quality of the technology with competitors. In fact, many companies
have employees sign non-compete clauses to keep competitors from gaining access to information
about how a technology works. Again, we could relax this assumption by discounting the weight that
decision makers place on the behavior of prior decision makers.
Assumption #6: Decision makers make choices sequentially. This means that each decision maker
has some decision makers who decide before and some who decide after her. This also means that
the time of decision making is known. For the choice between two technologies, this is not an
unreasonable assumption. However, when the choice is between a technology and the status quo,
then for those who follow the status quo it is not necessarily clear when those decisions were made.
A decision maker following the status quo may have evaluated the alternative and decided against it,
or she may not yet have performed an evaluation. One possible way to alleviate the status quo
problem would be to discount the decisions of those people following the status quo. In this case, the
impact of a status quo decision would be less than the impact of an adoption decision. We will
discuss the implications of this possibility later, when we derive results.
Another issue relevant to the status quo is that following the status quo is not irreversible. If someone
chooses at a decision point not to adopt, she may later choose to adopt. In fact, this issue is not
limited to the adopt vs. status quo decision; adopters can choose A today and change to B at a later
date. This assumption could be relaxed, a possibility we consider later in directions for future
research.
Assumption #7: Decision makers know the sequence of prior decisions and the initial conditions.
Thus, they are fully informed and rational. Though they face uncertainty, they face no ambiguity. This
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is a standard economic modeling assumption. In most cases, decision makers will likely only observe
a few other individuals. We analyze this in more detail in the section on distributions of potential
adopters.
Assumption #8: Decisions are observable, but reasons for decisions (private information) are not.
This means that decision makers can see the technology adopted by prior decision makers. For the
case of competing technologies, this is a reasonable assumption, but as discussed above, for cases
of a new technology vs. the status quo, it may be questionable. We also note that the Internet and
similar technologies probably allow decision makers to know more about the reasons for adoption
now than in the past.
There are two issues that arise from these assumptions. First, many of the assumptions could be
relaxed and made more realistic by discounting prior decision makers’ behavior. We do not include
this complication in our analysis, so our presentation can be thought of as an upper bound on
information cascade effects.
The second issue is that not all these assumptions are relevant in all adoption environments. Thus, it
is worthwhile to consider when they hold more strongly. In general, we contend that the assumptions
hold for technologies with considerable uncertainty in the short run. We call this early adoption of
novel technologies. In particular, the assumptions that require the distribution from which decision
makers receive signals to remain constant are easily satisfied in the short run. One can imagine, for
example, firms implementing enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems. It may take many months
(or even years) from the time of the adoption decision (i.e., writing the first check) to having a system
implemented and operating in the organization. During that time, technologies may not change and
other adopters may not gain (or look for) any additional information upon which to base their
decisions.
The short-run time frame and novel technologies also suggest small numbers of adopters. The group
of technophile or cutting-edge early adopters is often limited and they make their decisions relatively
quickly. Early adoption is particularly important because it sets the stage for subsequent technology
decisions, especially for technologies that have network effects. Even when technologies do not have
network effects, they are often subject to considerable path dependency, so that early decisions
shape how a technology evolves. Thus, while the assumptions we make may not apply to all
adoption situations, they apply to a very important subset of such decisions.
The short-run, small-number-of-adopters focus of the present research differentiates it from past
information cascade work (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Other work is usually concerned with
asymptotic results (Smith and Sørensen, 2000). However, the short-run adjustment is arguably most
appropriate for IT adoption decisions.

4. Theory Formalization
Given the background and assumptions discussed above, we can now formalize the model. Assume
that decision makers are faced with two technologies: A and B. They receive a private signal about
the relative merits of the two technologies, which comes from a NORMAL(μA, σ2) distribution if A is the
better choice and a NORMAL(μB, σ2) distribution if B is the better choice. (Here, μA and μB represent
the difference in values between A and B, so a more descriptive subscript might be μ(A-B > 0) and μ(A-B <
0). However, in the interest of readability, we will keep μA and μB.) The private signal is a single
realization from the distribution, and the decision maker’s problem is to determine from which
distribution the realization came.
Let lower case letters denote the decision maker’s choice, so that a indicates that the decision maker
chooses technology A and b indicates that the decision maker chooses technology B. A decision
maker would like to make choice a when μA > μB and choice b otherwise. The first decision maker’s
prior information suggests that A is better than B with probability pA, and B is better with probability 1pA.
Given the prior, the decision maker then receives a private signal an based on this private signal must
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choose between A and B. Thus, the potential adopter’s decision criterion can be represented as a
threshold that depends on the probabilities of A being better and B being better and the relative costs
of the decisions, which we discuss below. If an observed private signal exceeds this threshold, then
the observer will conclude that technology A should be adopted (recall that the distributions represent
the value of A minus the value of B).
For a given decision criterion, the probability of correctly concluding that A is the better technology is
Prob(a|μA),2 while the probability of incorrectly concluding that B is the better technology when A is the
better technology is Prob(b|μA) = 1 - Prob(a|μA). The probability of incorrectly deciding that A is better
when it is not is Prob(a|μB), and the probability of correctly deciding that B is better when it actually is
better is Prob(b|μB) = 1- Prob(a|μA<μB). These possibilities are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Possible outcomes of decision task
Potential adopter’s identification

A better (a)
Prob(a|μA)
Prob(a|μB)

A better (μA)
B better (μB)

Reality

B better (b)
Prob(b|μA)
Prob(b|μB)

Given that both distributions have the same variance, a measure of the ability of a potential adopter to
differentiate between the merits of A and B is d’ = μA/σ- μB/σ, which is simply the standardized
difference between the two means. These assumptions are illustrated in Figure 1.

0.6

Probability Mass

0.5
Distribution if B better
than A

0.4

Distribution if A better
than B

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

Observation of Estimated Value

Figure 1: Distributions of private signals concerning an information technology
The potential adopter’s problem is to select a threshold beyond which he will conclude that the private
signal came from the μA distribution.3 In other words, the potential adopter chooses the minimum
observed value of a private signal that will lead him to believe that A is the better technology. Any
observed values above that threshold will lead him to decide that A is better and any observations
2

The notation μA means that the observation came from the distribution with μA as a mean. It does not refer to the
mean of the distribution; rather, it refers to the distribution from which the signal came. The term should literally be
2
2
read as “NORMAL(μA,σ ).” Thus, Prob(a|μA) is shorthand for Prob(a|(The signal comes from a NORMAL(μA,σ )
distribution)). The notation μB means that the observation came from the distribution with μB as a mean.
3
Because the labels A and B are arbitrary, we will let A be the label of the better technology for this analysis. The
results are symmetrical if B is better. This can be seen simply by re-labeling all the As as Bs and vice versa.
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below the threshold will lead him to decide that B is better.
The four possible outcomes of a decision task are graphed in Figure 2. It can be seen that the
probabilities of all possible outcomes are determined by the choice of threshold. Further, it is
apparent that increasing the probability of concluding that A is better when it actually is better
(Prob(a|μA)) also increases the probability of falsely concluding that A is better when it is not
(Prob(a|μB)).
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Figure 2: Regions for different decision outcomes
A threshold is chosen to be the location where the ratio of the heights of the probability density
functions of distributions A and B is greater than some value. This is expressed mathematically as
choosing a if

Pr(a |  A )
.
Pr(a |  B )

(1)

The probabilities define a likelihood ratio, which is the ratio of the heights of the distributions at a point
in Figure 2. For example, the value of β in Figure 2 is set to two. Thus, at the threshold represented
by the vertical line r(β), the height of the μA distribution is twice the height of the μB distribution.
The optimal threshold is chosen by balancing the costs and benefits of each outcome along with the
prior probability of each distribution. The optimal value of β (see Green and Swets, 1966) in this case
is



Pr(  B )Benefit (b |  B )  Benefit (a |  B )  Pr(  B )

k.
Pr(  A )Benefit (a |  A )  Benefit (b |  A )  Pr(  A )

(2)

The variable k represents the relative benefits of the outcomes shown in Tale 1. Though k is
mathematically simple, it is conceptually complex and requires explanation. The variable k
represents the relative differences between the values of the technologies in different states of the
world. The numerator is the difference between the value of adopting A and the value of adopting B
given that the unknown state of the world is B is better. The decision maker does not know whether B
is better, but she can form some estimate of the value of each technology in the case that B is better.
The denominator is the difference between the value of adopting A and the value of adopting B given
that the unknown state of the world is A is better. The implication is that as k increases, a decision
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maker will require a greater private observation to convince her to adopt the technology.
There is a variety of ways that k can be made large (or small). Large or small values of k do not
require huge differences in the technologies. Rather, extreme values of k require that in one state of
the world the technologies are fairly similar in value and in one state they are fairly different. In fact, it
is easy for k to be extreme when the technologies are very similar in each possible state of the world.
For example, if in one state of the world the technologies are so similar as to only produce a $1
difference in value, and in the other state they are even more similar, differing in value by a mere
penny, then k=100 (or 1/100, depending on which state has a dollar’s difference). Thus, large and
small values of k do not suggest any dramatic technical differences; rather, they just suggest how
relatively costly it is to make a mistake.
As a practical matter, it is absurd to apply this model if the differences are a dollar and a penny. We
would expect that in real situations there is some meaningful difference in the relative values in
different states of the world. In situations in which the cost of choosing incorrectly is high (i.e.,
benefits are low), and the benefit of choosing correctly is high, we might see some high values of k.
That is, high-risk, high-return projects represent a class of extreme k decisions that would be
important, whereas choices differing by dollars and pennies would be a class of extreme k projects
that would be of little interest. However, we must emphasize that the value of k gives us no
information about the relative merits of each technology. Instead, it tells us the relative merits of
choosing a technology in different states of the world.
Consider the following example. Recently, a company called SCO filed a patent infringement suit
against IBM. SCO alleged that users of IBM Linux should pay licensing fees to SCO, and SCO sent
licensing contracts to Linux users. For the sake of the example, assume that if SCO’s claims had
been upheld in court Linux users would have had to pay $1,000; if the claims were not upheld Linux
users would have had to pay $0. On the other hand, users could purchase Microsoft Windows for,
say, $500, regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit. If Linux is technology A and Windows is
technology B, and we assume the gross value (i.e., before paying the licensing fee) of an operating
system license is $1,000, then benefit(a|μA) = benefit of Linux given that IBM wins the lawsuit =
$1,000-$0 = $1,000. Similarly, benefit(b|μA) = benefit of Windows given that IBM wins the lawsuit =
$1,000-$500, so the denominator is $1,000-$500 = $500. On the other hand, if IBM loses and B is the
correct choice, then benefit(b|μB) = benefit of Windows, given that IBM loses the lawsuit = $1,000$500 = $500, and benefit(a|μB) = $1,000-$1,000 = $0, so the numerator is $500. This yields a k of 1.
Of course, there is no reason SCO should limit the licensing fee to $1,000. If they instead charged
$2,000, then Linux is still better if IBM wins and still worse if IBM loses, but benefit(a|μB) = $1,000$2,000 = -$1,000, so the numerator is $1,500. This yields a k of 3. On the other hand, if SCO
charged a fee of $600, Linux is still better if IBM wins and still worse if IBM loses, but benefit(a|μB) =
$1,000-$600 = $400, so the numerator is $100. This yields a k of 0.2.
The source of uncertainty in this example is whether IBM will win, which depends in part on facts and
opinions about the strength of SCO’s case. Ignoring any technical distinctions between the two
operating systems, a private signal would be the opinion of a firm’s legal counsel, and the public
observation would be whether other firms chose Linux or Windows.
Of course, our description simplifies the case, and we chose costs for ease of addition, but this is a
real situation that is not well explained by traditional theories such as network externality theory or
social benefit-based herding. It is reasonable to assume that firms consulted their legal counsels and
that they attended to the actions of other firms.
Thus far, we have established the decision task of the potential adopter. The task is relatively
straightforward. The potential adopter sets an acceptance threshold based on the relative benefits of
adoption and rejection, forms an opinion of the technology, and adopts the technology if his opinion is
higher than the threshold and rejects it otherwise. The problem is that potential adopters know they
may be wrong and would like to incorporate better information into their decisions. One way they can
do this is by considering the behavior of others (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997, Fichman, 2000).
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As noted above, in uncertain environments with sequential choices, potential adopters can increase
their own information by considering the observed choices of prior potential adopters (Bikhchandani
et al., 1992, Bikhchandani et al., 1998, Li, 2004, Walden and Browne, 2002)).4 To formalize this idea,
assume that potential adopters can perfectly identify prior potential adopters’ decisions but cannot
identify the private information that led to those decisions (as discussed in the assumptions section
above). Nor can they observe the benefits accruing to other IT adopters, because those benefits take
too long to become apparent (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1998, Brynjolfsson and Yang, 1997). Thus,
potential adopters can make use of prior information if they condition their own estimates of the
probabilities of A and B on the prior potential adopters’ choices. Therefore, Pr(μB) becomes
Pr(μB|prior potential adopters’ IT adoption decisions) and Pr(μA) becomes Pr(μA|prior potential
adopters’ IT adoption decisions). In other words, if one potential adopter sees a prior potential
adopter adopt, then he infers that the prior adopter must have had a sufficiently high opinion of the IT
to make that choice.
Consider a situation in which each potential adopter faces the same costs and benefits. Denote
potential adopter t’s prior beliefs to be Pr(μA)t and Pr(μB)t, which will depend on the sequence of
adoption decisions that occurred before time t. Potential adopter t+1 will have prior beliefs denoted
Pr(μA) t+1 = Pr(μA|Dt, Dt-1, Dt-2, … D1) and Pr(μ) Bt+1 = Pr(μB|Dt, Dt-1, Dt-2, … D1), where Dt is the tth
potential adopter’s observable decision. By Bayes’ theorem, it can be shown that

Pr(  A ) t 1  Pr(  A | Dt , Dt 1 , Dt  2 ..., D1 ) 

Pr(  A ) Pr( Dt , Dt 1 , Dt  2 ..., D1 |  A )
, (3)
Pr( Dt , Dt 1 , Dt 2 ..., D1 )

and
Pr(  B ) t 1  Pr(  B | Dt , Dt 1 , Dt  2 ..., D1 ) 

Pr(  B ) Pr( Dt , Dt 1 , Dt  2 ..., D1 |  B )
. (4)
Pr( Dt , Dt 1 , Dt 2 ..., D1 )

Substituting these two results into (2) yields

 t 1 



Pr(  B ) t 1
Pr(  A ) t 1

Pr(  B ) Pr( Dt , Dt 1 , Dt 2 ..., D1 |  B )
Pr( Dt , Dt 1 , Dt 2 ..., D1 )
k
k
Pr(  A ) Pr( Dt , Dt 1 , Dt 2 ..., D1 |  A )
Pr( Dt , Dt 1 , Dt 2 ..., D1 )

(5)

Pr( Dt , Dt 1 , Dt  2 ..., D1 |  B )  Pr(  B ) 
k ,

Pr( Dt , Dt 1 , Dt  2 ..., D1 |  A )  Pr(  A ) 

where k is the constant determined by the costs and benefits of each outcome (assumed to be the
same for each potential adopter), and Pr(μB) and Pr(μA) are the prior probabilities assumed by the first
potential adopter.
It is important to note that the probability of an observed action, Dt, given a particular distribution, is
dependent on all prior decisions (such situations have been referred to as “history-dependent” (Mussi,
2002)). Define At as the set of all prior decisions so that At = {Dt-1, Dt-2,…D1} for all t>1. Then (5) can
be rewritten as

4

It is worth noting that the present work can be distinguished from research that has investigated sequential
decisions made by the same individual. Such decisions have been studied in a wide variety of contexts (e.g.,
Busemeyer, 1982, Mussi, 2002, Puterman, 1994, Seale and Rapaport, 1997, Shanteau, 1970, Sullivan et al., 1995).
In the present research, we are concerned with each of several decision makers who face the same decision.
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 t 1 

Pr( Dt |  B , At ) Pr( Dt 1 |  B , At 1 )... Pr( D2 |  B , A2 ) Pr( D1 |  B )  Pr(  B ) 
k

Pr( Dt |  A , At ) Pr( Dt 1 |  A , At 1 )... Pr( D2 |  A , A2 ) Pr( D1 |  A )  Pr(  A ) 

 Pr( Dt |  B , At )  Pr( Dt 1 |  B , At 1 )   Pr( D2 |  B , A2 )  Pr( D1 |  B )   Pr(  B ) 

...

 
 
k .




Pr(
D
|
,
A
)
Pr(
D
|
,
A
)
Pr(
D
|
,
A
)
Pr(
D
|
)
t
A
t 
t 1
A
t 1  
2
A
2 
1
A   Pr(  A ) 

(6)
This equation is interesting because the portion in brackets is β1. Notice further that β2 is the term in
brackets multiplied by the last term in parentheses, and β3 is the term in brackets multiplied by the
last two terms in parentheses. This can be expressed more generally as

 Pr( Dt |  B , At ) 
  t .
 t 1  

Pr(
D
|
,
A
)
t
A
t 


(7)

This means that the decision threshold for any given potential adopter depends on the prior potential
adopter’s observed decision, and is, in fact, the prior potential adopter’s threshold multiplied by some
factor dependent upon the prior decision. We can also unambiguously show the direction of the
change from (5).
Note that the assumption that each distribution is normal with the same variance implies that β is a
monotonic function and thus can be inverted. Inverting the β function gives us the observed value
that corresponds to each level of the likelihood ratio.
Given the value of r and the decision, it can be seen that the relevant probabilities are

Pr(b |  B ) t 

r ( t )

r ( t )









  ( B )dr 

  (

A

)dr  Pr(b |  A ) t

(8)

A

)dr  Pr(a |  A ) t .

(9)

and
Pr(a |  B ) t 

  (

B

)dr 

r ( t )

  (

r ( t )

Combining this with (5) shows
Pr(a |  B ) t
 1   t 1   t
Pr(a |  A ) t

(10)

and
Pr(b |  B ) t
 1   t 1   t .
Pr(b |  A ) t

(11)

Thus, if potential adopter t chooses b, then potential adopter t+1 has a more lax decision threshold
than potential adopter t, meaning that potential adopter t+1 is more likely to choose b than potential
adopter t. Conversely, if potential adopter t chooses a, then potential adopter t+1 has a more strict
decision threshold than potential adopter t, meaning that potential adopter t+1 is more likely to
choose a than potential adopter t.
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Next, consider a sequence of decisions in which each decision is the same—a in this case. Then, the
β function at any decision time t can be written as

 t 1  Pr(a |  B , Ai ) t    Pr(  B ) 
  
k .
 t    

 i 1  Pr(a |  A , Ai ) t    Pr(  A ) 

(12)

After the first three decisions, this equals




 (  B )dr 


  


   r (  * )(  B ) dr    

 1* 
  (  B )dr 
 r   1



dr
(
)


   r (  * ) A    r (  * )
 *
 3    1     1
 1 .


 (  A )dr    (  A )dr 





     (  B ) dr    r ( 1* )
 * 

 r   r ( 1* )




1 
     (  A ) dr   


*



   r ( 1 )

 

(13)

This is a particularly difficult equation to solve because the limits of integration for each successive
decision are constrained by the r function of the product of all prior decisions. In general, this can be
expressed as a highly complex recursive equation.
The variable of interest is the probability of adoption, which is actually two probabilities—Pr(a|μA) and
Pr(a|μB). As signal detection theory illustrates, a decision to adopt can be correct or incorrect relative
to the real state of the world. The probability of correctly adopting A when A is actually better can be
represented as


Pr(a |  A ) t  x 
r(

  (

A

)dr ,

(14)

tx )

where

r

ln( )2 2   B2   A2 5
.
2(  A   B )

(15)

This means that

  x 1  Pr( Dt  x |  B , At  x )    Pr(  B )   2

ln   
k 2   B2   A2
 0  Pr( Dt  x |  A , At  x )    Pr(  A )  



.
r ( t  x )  
2(  A   B )

(16)

As discussed above, in (5), it is straightforward to show how β changes over time, but it is not obvious
how the probability of adoption changes over time because (14) does not have a closed form solution.
However, we can graphically examine the question and offer a solution for (14). The graphical
examination is shown in Figure 3.
5

Recall that in an earlier footnote we defined the notion μA to mean the text “NORMAL(μA,σ2).” To avoid confusion,

we note that here and in the next equation the bar over

A

refers to the mean of the distribution, not the fact that the

observation came from the distribution. In other words, the random variable μA has mean
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Figure 3: Changes in threshold for consecutive adoption decisions
The figure is graphed assuming μA = 1, μB = 0, σ2 = 1, k = 10, Pr(μA) = Pr(μB) = ½, and all potential
adopters choose to adopt. It can be seen from the figure that the first adoption decision has a
tremendous effect on the threshold set by the second potential adopter. This is due to the fact that k
was set very high, meaning that the cost for adopting if B were true was high.
Thus, there is an extreme bias toward choosing not to adopt. The value of r for the first adopter is 2.8.
Any private opinion exceeding 2.8 is highly unlikely, but given that it did occur, and thus the first
potential adopter chose to adopt, the second potential adopter received a great deal of information.
The probability of an observation from the μA distribution exceeding 2.8 is .036. However, the
probability of an observation from the μB distribution exceeding 2.8 is only .003. Thus, the probability
of an observation coming from the μA distribution conditional on the knowledge that the observation
was greater than 2.8 is 12 times the probability of an observation being from the μB distribution
conditional on the 2.8 threshold. Therefore, a decision to adopt by decision maker t changes the prior
belief of the t+1 potential adopter significantly.
Notice also that as the threshold decreases, the amount of information in a positive adoption decision
decreases. This occurs because the relative amounts of probability mass to the right of the threshold
are very similar, and thus the ratios of the cumulative density functions are close to one. For example,
if the second potential adopter, facing the threshold r(βt=2), chooses to adopt, the updated prior for the
third potential adopter does not change much. Specifically, the probability that an observation came
from the A-is-better distribution conditional on the observation being greater than the threshold is .79,
but the probability that an observation came from the B-is-better distribution conditional on it
exceeding the threshold is .42. This ratio of 1.9 is considerably less than the ratio of 12 obtained from
the first potential adopter’s adoption choice.
It is worth noting that the fact that each subsequent decision has a positive impact on the probability
of the next adopter making the same decision is the hallmark of herding behavior (Abrahamson, 1991,
Fichman, 2000, Kauffman and Li, 2003). Thus, our theory allows for herding even among rational
adopters if information about the relative merits of two technologies is poor.
A graph of the marginal impacts of successive identical decisions based on Figure 3 is presented in
Figure 4. The figure illustrates a positive but declining impact of subsequent decisions on the
probability of choosing to adopt for both the B-is-better and A-is-better distributions. Thus, regardless
of the actual distribution, subsequent observed decisions lead to increased probability of making the
same decision.
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Figure 4: Marginal impacts of successive identical adoption decisions
The probability of making the same decision increases with the number of identical decisions, but it
increases at a decreasing rate. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, it is important to ask whether
the probability of making the same decision as others converges to some value. In other words, is
herding absolute, as herding literature often assumes? Smith and Sørensen (2000) show that under
certain conditions the probability of making a particular decision does converge. From an applied
perspective, it is more interesting to examine the convergence path. The rate and reliability of the
convergence path determine how organizations can make use of this theory in the real world. The
behavior at n = ∞ is irrelevant to any real world application and, pragmatically, potential adopters will
probably have trouble incorporating a large number of prior decisions into their own decision (Miller,
1956). Thus, two important research questions are:

Research question 1: Do the decisions of sequential potential adopters
converge?
Research question 2: What is the convergence path?
Herding is fickle if based on fashion alone, but rational herding based on information aggregation may
not be. When one potential adopter decides against a stream of identical decisions, she changes the
threshold in the opposite direction. Thus, if potential adopter t had a lax decision criterion and still
failed to adopt, potential adopter t+1 would utilize a strict decision criterion. As noted above, with a
lax decision criterion, a positive adoption decision is not very informative, but a negative adoption
decision contains a great deal of information. The magnitude of the change depends on the
magnitude of the decision criterion. Based on the fact that subsequent identical decisions quickly
move the threshold toward a bias for making the same decision, it can be seen that contrary
decisions have more impact than confirmatory decisions. 6 However, the magnitude of contrary
decisions is not clear. Thus, it is useful to consider the impact of a contrary decision on the
convergence path of sequential decisions. This yields our third research question.

Research question 3: What is the effect of contrary decisions on the
convergence path?

6

It is worth noting the relevance of the present discussion to science and decision-making behavior generally. A
single confirmatory observation often makes a great deal of difference in driving a conclusion, but adding additional
confirmatory observations makes increasingly less difference to the conclusion. Confirmations quickly lead to
asymptotic confidence in a conclusion in many situations. This line of reasoning also explains why science seeks to
disconfirm conclusions rather than confirm them.
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Innovations often diffuse through social networks based on strong communication channels
(Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997, Fichman, 2000, Rogers, 1995, Zmud, 1983). Thus, it is
important to investigate the effects of our adoption theory if adopters are in closed groups (e.g.,
industries, geographies, social groups) rather than in a totally open environment in which everyone
can see everyone else. Our fourth research question is:

Research question 4: What is the effect of groups of potential adopters on the
number of correct decisions?

5. Research Design
Simulation is often used to examine models of technology diffusion (Abrahamson, 1991, Abrahamson
and Rosenkopf, 1997, Oh and Jeon, 2007) because the complex mathematical modeling has no
closed form solutions. Thus, typical derivatives cannot be calculated analytically. Instead, we specify
the parameters of the model and solve it many times. We then change the parameters and repeat
the process. When we graph the changes in the simulated behavior for different levels of parameters,
we offer a graphical representation of the effects of those parameters.
Our purpose with the simulation is to show the implications of the model for various levels of the
parameters. As Abrahamson and Rosenkopf observe, “Traditional rate-oriented models of innovation
diffusion do little to explain the occurrence, extent, and persistence of bandwagons” (Abrahamson
and Rosenkopf, 1993). To resolve this issue, these authors used a complicated simulation that
incorporated additional model parameters. The advantage of this approach is a more informative
model, but the drawback is the difficulty in solving the model. We follow these authors in using
simulation to solve our model. This technique requires that we specify the model and then have a
computer solve it many times under a variety of different assumptions. We then report the cumulative
results.
The simulation incorporates both implications and sensitivity. For example, different technologies will
surely have different costs and benefits and thus different values of k. To establish how the model
changes with these different levels of k, we simulate a wide range of ks in Figure 7 (discussed below).
By plotting several levels of k on the same graph, we show how the model works at different levels of
the parameter and develop an understanding of the sensitivity of the model to changes in the
parameter.
Throughout, we drew the observed values from the A-is-better distribution. The A-is-better and the Bis-better distributions were normally distributed with variances of one and means of one and zero,
respectively. The results are identical with respect to any scaling that preserves the measure d’ (see
Green and Swets, 1966). If d’ increases, then the convergence will be much quicker because the
confidence with which a value is attributed to a particular distribution will be higher. The reverse is
true if d’ decreases. The priors Pr(μA) and Pr(μB ) were both 0.5, indicating that, in the absence of any
other information, they were equally likely. We varied k, the relative cost and benefit, thereby varying
β. We note the value of k below each graph.

6. Data and Results
6.1. Convergence
We begin by addressing our first two research questions, which concern whether the decisions of
sequential potential adopters converge and the appearance of the convergence path. The answers
are not intuitive from the equations and so bear testing. To answer the first question, we ran a string
of 1,000 repetitions of 100 decisions. The results of this simulation are shown in Figure 5.
The figure shows two important characteristics. First, there is not convergence to the correct decision
after 100 decisions. Specifically, 96.4 percent of the 100th potential adopters chose the correct
distribution. The second item to notice is the jaggedness of the line, which indicates that even at 100
decisions, there are still reversals. For example, 96.3 percent of the 98th potential adopters made the
correct decision, so in one trial “someone” reversed the prevailing decision at the 99th decision. Note
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Percent Making Correct Decision

also that even at the extremes, potential adopters may reverse in the incorrect direction. Between the
91st and 92nd decision, 0.3 percent of the potential adopters reversed in the incorrect direction.
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Figure 5: Convergence of Decisions, 1,000 samples of 100 decisions, k = 1, d’=1

Percent Making Correct Decision

This suggests that several forces are at work, making convergence a more difficult issue than
previously believed. We should be concerned not with absolute convergence, but with the speed of
convergence. This depends on the relative costs and benefits of making correct or incorrect
inferences about the merits of A and B and the discriminability of signals. The variable k captures
these costs and the variable d’ captures discriminability. Varying d’ moves the signal distributions
either closer together or farther apart. The units of d’ are standard deviations, so d’ = 1 means the
distributions are one standard deviation apart. This is a measure of the uncertainty of the signal. As
d’ approaches zero, the ability to discriminate between distributions approaches zero, and as d’
approaches infinity, the ability to discriminate approaches infinity. The effects of different levels of d’
on the rate of convergence are reported in Figure 6. As discrimination improves, decision makers
more quickly converge on the correct decision because both their own private signals and the inferred
signals of others are more reliable.
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Figure 6: Effect of Discrimination on Convergence in 1,000 samples of 100, k = 2
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Varying k produces different rates of convergence, as shown in Figure 7. Note that the observations
are actually coming from the A-is-better distribution, so the correct decision is a.
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Figure 7: Effect of Costs on Convergence in 1,000 samples of 100, d’ = 1
Notice that when k is very high, it is not clear that there is any convergence to the correct decision.
Large k implies that the difference in benefit between the two technologies when B is the correct
choice is large relative to the difference in benefit when A is the correct choice. This means that if B is
the correct choice, then B is much better than A, but if A is the correct choice there is not much
difference. Returning to the Linux licensing example, high k indicates that if IBM wins, there is not
much difference in cost between Linux and Windows, but if IBM loses the price of Linux will be much
greater than the price of Windows. In this situation, even if SCO’s case is weak, potentially adopting
firms may not be willing to take the risk of adopting Linux. Note further that with increases in k, many
potential adopters make incorrect decisions even after viewing 99 prior decisions. For example, at k
= 5, the 100th potential adopter is only 78.5 percent likely to make the correct decision and 21.5
percent likely to make the wrong one. Even if k is small, we still do not achieve convergence after
100 decisions.
If the net benefit of choosing A when A is better is greater than the net benefit of choosing B when B is
better,7 then potential adopters will have a low k, which will lead to a bias toward A. This is good if A
is, in fact, the better technology. However, if B is the better technology, then this situation can lead to
many incorrect decisions even after additional information is incorporated by decision makers. This is
particularly troubling if B is the status quo, because it leads to a bias toward adoption (Abrahamson,
1991). If this bias is present, it can help explain why there are so many failed IT implementations.
Recently, however, perceptions of the benefits of IT in at least some areas of the popular press seem
to have become more negative (Carr, 2003). If this is the case, we may experience a period of
underadoption of technically efficient IT.
We include k=100 to show the limiting behavior. This level of k is probably rare, but is fairly easy to
imagine. One good example is the recent patent case concerning Research In Motion (RIM) Co.’s
Blackberry (Krazit and Broache 2006). At some point in the past, RIM faced a decision about what
technology to use to connect wireless devices to wired networks to deliver email messages from the
wireless Blackberry. They chose a technology (A) and later claimed to have developed a workaround
7

This can occur for a variety of reasons. Ceteris paribus, if the gross benefit of choosing A when A is better
increases, then k decreases. Ceteris paribus, if the gross benefit of choosing B when A is better is very small or
negative, then k decreases. Also, if the benefit of choosing A and the benefit of choosing B are very close when B is
better, then k decreases. Put another way, if choosing B when A is correct is a significant mistake, but choosing A
when B is correct is a minor mistake, then k is small.
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(technology B) (Hamblin, 2006). The k they faced can be decomposed based on a state of the world
in which technology A may or may not have already been patented. We assume that if technology A
had not been patented, it is slightly more efficient and the better choice; thus, the benefit of a|A is
some number and the benefit of b|A is a similar but smaller number because we assume that A is
somewhat more efficient. On the other hand, if A had been patented and B had not been, then B is
the better choice by far. This means the benefit of b|B is much greater than the benefit of a|B. In this
particular instance, technology A had been patented and RIM was forced to make a settlement
payment of $612.5 million to the owner of technology A (Krazit and Broache, 2006). We can easily
imagine that from a technical perspective A may have only been a million dollars better, which would
give a k of 611.5 for this particular technology. This situation also occurred when Microsoft settled
with Eolas for $521 million for using patented technology in Internet Explorer Plug-ins, and when
Microsoft settled with Intertrust for $440 million for choosing the wrong technology for digital rights
management. This patent issue is present any time a firm makes choices about a technology to
include in a product. The point is that in these cases k is large and there are very few observable
differences between technologies. The private signal represents the quality of the patent search
performed prior to implementation.
It is useful to pause here and discuss how these results are different from Bikhchandani et al. (1992).
In the former paper decision makers could converge to either the correct or incorrect decision.
However, in our formulation of the model decision makers seem to be converging to the correct
decision almost all the time. This is because each new decision lets new information enter the
system, as shown in Figure 4. Thus, even false starts are overcome with time, as anticipated by
Bikhchandani, et al. (1998). Even when many people choose the wrong distribution, eventually
someone receives a signal high enough to overcome it and choose the correct distribution. However,
if the costs (i.e., k) are high enough, the probability of someone receiving a high enough signal is
extraordinarily low. For example, at k=100, the probability of receiving a signal extreme enough to
make someone choose the correct distribution is less than one in two million.

Percent Making Correct Decision

Based on the results of the first simulation, a natural question to ask is whether 100 decisions are
enough to achieve convergence to the correct decision. Perhaps more repetitions are necessary.
More to the point, it is not clear whether the threshold moves faster than the probability needed to
overcome it. To test this question, we ran simulations of 1,000,000 decisions, as shown in Figure 8.
However, even at 1,000,000 decisions potential adopters make incorrect decisions. At the same time,
the number of correct decisions at 100,000 decisions is different from the number at 1,000,000,
suggesting that even after 100,000 observations potential adopters may reverse if they receive a
private signal that is sufficiently extreme.
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Figure 8: Convergence of Decisions, 1,000 samples of 1,000,000 decisions, k = 5, d’=1
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We have kept k constant across all potential adopters in a particular simulation. This implies that the
costs and benefits for every potential adopter are similar. It is worth noting, though, that this might not
always be the case. For example, in the SCO vs. RIM case discussed above, after SCO filed its case,
Hewlett-Packard (HP) indemnified all its Linux users against SCO licensing litigation. In other words,
HP said it would pay the licensing fee if SCO won the case. This would clearly change k by making it
smaller. Similarly, when SCO filed the lawsuit, it increased k. Therefore, we explore the impacts of
different ks in Figure 9. We specify k = 5 for the first 10 decision makers and then k = 100 for the
remainder of the decision makers.
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Figure 9: The effect of a change in k at the 11th decision in 1,000 samples of 100, d’=1
The graph shows that increasing k increases the threshold and thereby reduces the probability of
making the correct adoption decision for the 11th and following adopters. However, it does not reduce
the probability to near zero as it did when k was fixed at 100 for all decision makers. Moreover, the
probability of adopting continues to increase after the 11th adopter, whereas it remained constant
when all adopters had a k of 100. This occurs because the first ten adopters had a threshold
sufficiently low to allow some information into the system. Though the 11th adopter is faced with a
very high k, he also has enough information about other adopters’ signals to judge the relative
probabilities of A and B being the better choice, so he is relatively confident that adopting technology
A is a good idea even if his own cost of a mistake is high.
This helps explain why, for example, firms give away trial copies and why it is so important for
vendors to work closely with partners when first introducing a new technology. With a new technology,
potential adopters may have a high value of k because the cost of adopting A if B is in fact better is
high (a|μB). If this is the case, potential adopters are likely not to purchase the technology and no
information about it will enter the system. This, in turn, will cause more potential adopters to pass on
the technology. However, if the vendor of a technology can somehow mitigate the downside risk for a
few initial firms (either by giving away trial copies or by working closely with the initial adopters), then
it may be able to demonstrate that A is better and overcome future adopters’ concerns (particularly
a|μB). This is precisely the kind of change in k shown above. Comparing k=100 in Figure 9 and
Figure 7 shows the benefit to the vendor of mitigating the downside risk.

6.2. Impact of Contrary Decisions
One of the implications of information cascade theory is that because no new information enters the
system, decision makers never become particularly confident in their decisions. This property is
referred to as “fragility” (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). The concept of fragility is, to some degree, an
artifact of the Bikhchandani et al. (1992) model. With binary signals, the magnitude of the signal is
fixed, and so it is easy to establish a threshold beyond which the signal cannot have any impact.
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However, in our sequential adoption theory model, with continuous signals potential adopters may
receive extreme private observations that result in decisions that are contrary to the prevailing
cascade. Notice this is subtly different from the Bikhchandani et al. (1992) type of fragility because it
is endogenous to the model. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) require some input beyond the model such
as a change in preferences or more informed agents. In our model, fragility can result from the luck
of the draw based on what information decision makers use and how they interpret that information.
Thus, there may be another type of fragility, and we investigate this fragility in our third research
question concerning the impact of contrary decisions on the convergence path.
We looked at this effect by introducing a contradictory decision at the 25th decision. Specifically,
whatever the 24th potential adopter did, the 25th did the opposite.8 The results of this simulation are
displayed in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Effects of Contradictory Information in 1,000 samples of 100, k = 1, d’ = 1
The figure shows that the impact of contradictory information is tremendous. The percentage of
correct decisions dropped from 93 percent to 59 percent from the 24th to the 26th potential adopter.9
The mean threshold changed from 1.60 to 0.78. This is important, considering that the first potential
adopter was 70 percent likely to be correct and had a threshold of 0.50. This means that the
contradictory information of the 25th potential adopter more than reset the information in the string of
decisions. This occurred because the 26th potential adopter knew that the 25th potential adopter was
aware of all of the prior adoption decisions and had a threshold value larger in absolute value than
any prior potential adopter (1.62 on average). Thus, for the 25th potential adopter to reverse the
cascade, he must have received a very extreme private observation. Specifically, an observation of
less than –1.62 is 12 times as likely to have come from the B-is-better distribution as from the A-isbetter distribution. Therefore, the 26th potential adopter is much less likely to follow the first 23
decisions than was the 24th potential adopter.
A common sense explanation may help illustrate our point. At the 24th decision, there are three
possible states in which the system can exist: a correct cascade, an incorrect cascade, or no cascade
at all. If the 24th decision maker is in a correct cascade and the 25th decision maker chooses
8

We use the 25th decision because in both the 24th and 25th decisions 92.9% of the individuals make the same
th
th
choice; thus, by using the 25 decision, we control for extreme observations in the 24 decision.
9
Note that the probability that the 25th decision maker was correct was 7 percent and the probability that he was
th
incorrect was approximately 93 percent because he was forced to behave in an opposite manner to the 24 decision
maker. Thus, the important difference is between the 24th and 26th decision makers.
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incorrectly, then the 26th decision maker knows that the 25th decision maker must have had an
observation extreme enough to outweigh all of the prior decisions (although he does not know at this
point that the 25th decision maker’s choice was the opposite of what it should have been), so the 26th
decision maker sets his acceptance threshold a little higher than that of the 1st decision maker.
However, the 26th decision maker will probably receive a signal that favors the correct answer, so
even with the threshold slightly higher, the 26th decision maker has a reasonable chance of making
the correct decision. So the correct cascade starts again (although with slightly lower probability than
it would have started with in the first place).
On the other hand, if the 24th decision maker is in an incorrect cascade and the 25th chooses correctly,
then the 26th decision maker sets his acceptance threshold a little lower. This means he is more likely
to make the right decision than the 1st decision maker. Thus, contrary information is very damaging to
incorrect cascades.10
If the 24th person is not in a cascade, and the 25th person makes a decision opposite to that of the
24th, then the 26th decision maker has little information from the string of decisions that have come
before. Hence, the 26th decision maker puts a great deal of weight on his private signal, which is
likely to be correct, and therefore probably starts a correct cascade.
The point is that extreme observations are very harmful to incorrect cascades, but not very damaging
to correct cascades or non-cascades. This explains why we see an upward sloping curve on the
probability of being correct. As more decisions are made, extreme observations appear, which are
quite likely to reverse incorrect cascades and do little damage to correct cascades. This means that
the variance of the signal has a tendency to eventually bring most strings of adoptions toward the
correct decision. Moreover, this is an internal property of the model. It does not require an
exogenous change. By comparison, in the Bikhchandani et al. (1992) model there is a string of
decisions that rapidly converges to some probability less than one and greater than one half. On the
other hand, the probability of being correct in our model tends to converge to one (for moderate
values of k and d’). This is an endogenous property of the model, which tends to eliminate incorrect
cascades.

6.3. Distribution of Potential Adopters
The impact of groups of potential adopters is investigated by our fourth research question. It is
particularly useful to consider group decision making from the perspective of the decision motivator.
In the case of a novel technology, the decision motivator is the creator of that technology. From this
perspective, the important question concerns the distribution of possible outcomes. We examined
this issue by separating 100 potential adopters into groups and repeating the simulations, each with
1,000 samples. A group is a set of potential adopters who can observe one another’s actions. For
example, if the group size is 10, then the second potential adopter can observe the action of the first,
and the 10th can observe the actions of the first through the ninth. However, the 11th (the first adopter
in a new group of 10) can observe no other potential adopter, but the 12th can observe the 11th and
the 20th can observe the 11th through 19th. We are interested in the aggregate behavior of 100
decision makers if they are able to observe certain other potential adopters. A histogram of the
decisions is presented in Panel 1. Each histogram shows the outcomes of the group’s or groups’
decisions for 1,000 simulations, in which adoptions are sequential across groups.
The panel indicates that introducing the sequential effects causes the distribution of decisions to
become bi-modal as the group size of potential adopters increases. Increasing the number of
potential adopters participating in a sequence increases the mean of the distribution, but it also
increases the chance of having all potential adopters make an incorrect decision. Thus, the value to
a technology vendor of introducing a technology choice to a single large group or many small groups
depends upon the risk propensity of the vendor.11
10

It is important to note that we cannot say whether the probability of receiving a sufficiently extreme value decreases
faster than the threshold increases. In other words, the extremeness of an observation needed to reverse the
cascade increases with each decision. Given the results of our investigation of k, we expect this depends on the
value of k.
11
The benefit to a particular event is b = Σa prob(a)*U(a), where a is a specific outcome and U is a function
describing the individual adopter’s utility for that outcome. The second derivative of U reveals the adopter’s risk
attitude. If one is risk averse then U’’ < 0, so that doubling the outcome a more than doubles the utility. Organizing
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Panel 1: Distributions of decisions with different group sizes
When a vendor takes on a project with random payoffs, the utility of those payoffs may not change at
the same rate as the monetary value of the payoff. If the utility of a payoff increases more slowly than
the monetary value of a payoff, then the vendor is risk averse. Intuitively, doubling a payoff does not
always double the utility of a payoff. Therefore, when any decision maker chooses among potential
payoffs that have random outcomes, the decision maker must balance the risk she is taking against
the expected utility of the outcomes. To put it another way, the decision maker must receive some
premium for bearing increased risk. Figure 11 shows that while larger group sizes lead to larger
expected numbers of adopters, they also lead to larger standard errors. In the most extreme case,
when everyone adopts as a group, a vendor faces the risk of having no adoptions at all in exchange
for a high expected value. At the other end of the spectrum, when everyone decides independently,
vendors can expect a middling number of adoptions with very high certainty. A firm that is very risk
averse would prefer to have a small expected value with high probability, while a firm that is risk
seeking (or risk neutral) would prefer a higher expected number of adoptions even if there is a chance
of complete failure.
One important consideration with small groups is that they might share their signals with one another,
even if they are otherwise competitors. Sharing signals in this way would make each group more
likely to choose correctly. Such a situation would skew the results in Panel 1 to the right, and the
results would be more skewed the larger the group size.
adopters into different sized groups changes prob(a) as shown in the panel (which are frequency plots of prob(a)).
Obviously, changing prob(a) changes the overall benefit, but the type of change depends on the nature of the
individual’s utility U. If one is risk averse, then the increased probability of very poor outcomes associated with large
groups may outweigh the increased probability of very good outcomes, leading one to prefer small groups. However,
if one is risk neutral, then the increased expected value of large groups will lead one to prefer large groups. Thus, the
optimal group size from the decision motivator’s point of view depends on his or her attitude toward risk.
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Figure 11: Expected value and standard deviation of adoption by group size

7. Discussion
In this paper we have developed and tested a model of observational learning to explain technology
adoption decisions. Previous IS researchers have explained IT adoption in terms of costs and
benefits, network externalities, and social benefit-based herding. Our observational learning
explanation uses a modified version of the information cascade model of Bikhchandani et al. (1992).
While there are many papers that apply the other stated reasons for adoption, there are few (see, e.g.,
Walden and Browne, 2008) that make use of the information cascades model. We believe this is due
in part to the fact that the information cascades model is designed for theoretical elegance but
requires non-trivial adjustments to be useful for developing practical explanations. We have made
those adjustments and both derived new insights and presented a model that can be used as a
building block for developing a more unified view of adoption.
There are several important implications for adoption. Decision makers tend to follow one another
(herd), but they tend to do so in the correct direction. The probability of being correct increases as
more decisions are made rather than settling to some steady state. Our simulations suggest two
reasons for this result. First, we allow for extreme observations in the signals. Whereas others have
studied simple binary signals, we allow for signals to come from a normal distribution, and thus
decision makers are not limited to simply preferring one option or the other. Rather, they can prefer
one option a lot or a little or any amount. Second, when a decision maker reverses the prevailing
cascade, it more than resets the prior beliefs of the next decision maker. This is particularly
damaging for incorrect cascades. Thus, over time the possibility of extreme signals has a greater
tendency to reverse incorrect cascades than to reverse correct cascades. However, the behavior
depends on the costs and benefits. When the relative costs and benefits of bad and good choices as
embodied in the parameter k become extreme, decision makers do not necessarily converge to a
correct cascade. Convergence to a high probability of correct decisions also tends to be fairly slow,
and extreme values of k slow down the convergence even more. This means that it may take some
time for a decision maker to experience a signal sufficiently extreme to reverse an incorrect cascade.
This result has implications for the behavior of a population of adopters that is divided into groups that
can observe their internal members but not external members. If adopters are divided into large
groups, then most of the time almost all of them will make the correct decision (however, although
rare, occasionally almost all of them will make the incorrect decision). On the other hand, if adopters
are divided into small groups, a few decision makers will make the wrong decision, but most will make
55

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

Vol. 10 Issue 1 pp. 31-62 January 2009

Walden & Browne/Sequential Adoption Theory

the correct decision. The mean chance of being correct is higher for large groups, but the variance is
also higher.
Because adoption of IT is often quite complex, it is practically and scientifically useful to develop
numerous perspectives on the phenomenon. Decision makers in the business world likely consider
several different perspectives when making adoption decisions. At some point, most decision makers
probably ask questions such as, “Does this technology meet our requirements?,” “Can we afford it?,”
and “Will my superiors and peers see this as a good decision?” To these questions we add a
fundamental question from observational learning: “Do other adopters know something we don’t
know?”
This last question is extraordinarily important because of the role of observational learning in human
behavior and decision making. As noted, people generally learn by observing the behaviors of others,
making this mechanism one of the most powerful decision tools available. The observational learning
perspective is particularly important because the wisdom of considering others’ actions is often
questioned. Although blindly following others’ behavior without due consideration of one’s own signal
is obviously foolish (Tingling and Parent, 2003), the observational learning perspective suggests that
much is to be gained by incorporating the decisions of prior similarly-situated decision makers into
one’s own decision. In fact, some research shows that the real problem is not that decision makers
consider the actions of others, but that decision makers fail to weigh the actions of others heavily
enough (Yaniv, 2004).
Our model offers many implications for research and practice, as well as directions for future research.
For example, we have assumed that potential adopters can observe some characteristics of the IT
that hint at its nature (adopters’ private observations). However, we have not investigated those
characteristics. Although this allows the model to be generalized to a number of useful theories, it is
also important to consider what characteristics potential adopters evaluate in a technology. Is ease of
use or complexity or network size important, or are there other factors? Are these indicators different
across different technologies? Are some better indicators than others? There are various theories
that are relevant to this issue and that could be incorporated into sequential adoption theory.
For example, it is important to ask whether everyone observes the same factors. Currently, we
assume that the signal is a function both of the data and the observer, but it can be useful to separate
these two concepts. We would expect that the value of others’ actions would increase if the others
had observed different characteristics because it would allow for better discrimination. However, this
depends on whether and how well different characteristics predict the same outcome.
Another example concerns network effects. It would be straightforward, if perhaps tedious, to
incorporate network effects into the model by allowing the benefits and costs of the decision (i.e., the
constant k) to depend on network size. Of course, one could include other variables of interest in the
relative costs.
In our model we held k (the relative costs and benefits) fixed and inferred the information from the
decision. One could also hold the information content constant and infer k or, more specifically, the
determinants of the specific elements of k. Of course, one could also infer both k and the information.
Moreover, one could apply econometric techniques to estimate the values of the parameters
empirically.
This raises the point that k consists of four elements. It is important for adopters to recognize this and
incorporate estimates of each of these four components into their decision making. Not only will this
improve decision making, but it can also aid decision makers in classifying where problems might
emerge. This is not a new result, but we believe it is worth reiterating.
It is also important to understand how potential adopters assess the benefits for the different
outcomes in Table 1. There may be systematic biases that potential adopters introduce into their
judgments of benefits. IT adopters in particular may place more negative value on failing to adopt a
good technology than is warranted (Hitt and Frei, 1998). It is easy to envision this bias as a partial
explanation for the dotcom boom of the late 1990s.
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Anecdotal evidence in business is also available for the observational learning perspective. On the
back cover of the July 26, 2004 issue of Forbes magazine an advertisement for Oracle’s E-Business
Suite appeared. The ad read, “E*Trade Financial Runs The Oracle E-Business Suite. The Best
Companies Run Oracle Applications.” Oracle also has another ad using 1-800-Flowers, and recently
SAS has offered a similar advertisement. Several explanations are available that may explain the
use of these types of ads. For example, the cost-benefit framework is present. People looking for an
inexpensive video game are not likely to buy Oracle E-Business Suite, because it neither does what
they want nor fits their budget. Similarly, this ad signals an adoption that may implicate network
effects. The ad might also encourage social benefit-based herding, or be viewed as a celebrity
endorsement.
However, we believe that the best explanation for the goal of these ads is observational learning.
Decision makers in other companies see that 1-800-Flowers has adopted the Oracle product and
infer that 1-800-Flowers must have thought that adoption was a good decision. Thus, they
incorporate the information contained in that decision into their own decision making. If network
effects were the main driver, the ad would have been improved by listing many adopters rather than
just one. Similarly, 1-800-Flowers is not large enough or prominent enough to engender wide social
benefit-based herding. Being like 1-800-Flowers will not make regulators, customers, and vendors
treat a company better, nor will it make others view a company in a more flattering light. (Being like
General Electric or Walt Disney might accomplish these things, but not 1-800-Flowers.) We do not
completely discount other possible explanations for these ads, as we note above, but we argue that
observational learning is a strong potential explanation.
Our results also show that imitation in adoption decisions can be incorrect. Thus, we answer
Abrahamson’s (1991) call to investigate the diffusion of technically inefficient technologies and the
rejection of technically efficient technologies. However, both incorrect and correct fads can be
reversed by a sufficiently extreme private signal. Thus, the beginning and end of a fad are preceded
by unanticipated behavior of a pioneering decision maker.
We noted earlier that in most cases decisions to adopt a particular technology or to not adopt
(maintain the status quo) are not irreversible (Assumption #6). Relaxing this assumption in our model
can lead to numerous additional research questions. A model could be designed in which, rather than
specifying discrete decisions, individual decision makers are characterized by hazard functions that
specify their probability of adopting in a given period of time. Observational learning would occur by
allowing these hazard functions to be functions of other decision makers’ observed adoption
decisions. Any time one decision maker adopted, the probability of other decision makers adopting
over a given increment of time would increase. For increments of time when no one adopted, the
probability of other decision makers adopting over a given increment of time would decrease. Such
an extension could be very valuable for exploring questions of when adoption occurs and questions
about the costs of waiting. Moreover, private signals might become much more important in the
beginning stages of adoption, which would probably carry on to future stages. We are also unsure
how reversibility would impact the distributions of groups of adopters. This is clearly a limitation of the
current work that would be worthwhile to investigate further.
Another important finding is that the introduction of groups of potential adopters makes the distribution
of decisions bi-modal. These results (shown in Panel 1) are consistent with findings in behavioral
decision making research. Groups often make better decisions than individuals due to increased
discussion and differing points of view. This is consistent with the higher means of correct decisions
by groups in Panel 1. However, groups also are more likely to make extreme decisions, both good
and bad, due to phenomena such as group polarization, in which the dominant view in the group is
adopted and then rationalized and justified by the group members (El-Shinnawy and Vinze, 1998,
Isenberg, 1986, Lamm, 1988). This group rationalization process can lead to both good decisions
(for example, groups agreeing to high levels of charitable giving (Muehleman et al., 1976)) and
sometimes to extremely bad decisions (as, for example, in groupthink decisions and mob violence).
As shown in Panel 1, when there are many small social groups that are essentially independent, it is
very unlikely that all the groups will make the same correct (or incorrect) decision. Instead, some
groups will adopt a particular IT and some groups will not, subject largely to random events that gave
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the first adopters in that group a strong positive (or strong negative) signal. This could explain the
resilience of technologies that clearly do not perform as well as rivals. Absent illegal behavior or
overwhelming incentives, local preferences and random events generally prevent a single technology
from dominating all others when numerous independent groups are operating in the environment.
This may also explain why Oracle ran its ads using several different companies. E*Trade is a
financial services firm, while 1-800-Flowers is a retail firm. Thus, each ad targets a different group.
Our model also suggests another possible reason that each Oracle ad targets a different group. A
factor that is important when incorporating the decisions of others into a person’s own decision is how
similar that person is to the others. For example, ERP systems have generally worked well for
manufacturing firms but have been less effective for services firms. We have assumed that the
correct choice is perfectly correlated across firms in our simulations, but our model allows one to
change the correct choice to be imperfectly correlated. In other words, if technology A is the right
choice for company 1, then it is possible to model technology A as the correct choice for company 2
only 90 percent (or 80 percent or 73.5 percent) of the time. The important point is that none of the
other research perspectives allows us to examine such a question, though it is clearly relevant to
actual practice. Thus, we can ask questions with our model that have not yet been posed by IS
researchers.
In sum, sequential adoption theory offers an important explanation of the behavior of sequential,
similarly-situated potential adopters using a rigorous mathematical foundation based on established
theory. Our theory offers both researchers and practitioners a valuable tool for understanding
sequential adoption of technologies and other artifacts.
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APPENDIX
Below is the pseudo code for the simulation. The actual SAS code is available upon request.
1. Define k, priors prob(μA)= prob(μB)=0.5, σ2=1,

A

and

B

=> d’.

2. Calculate β = k*( prob(μB)/ prob(μA)).
3. Draw a signal from a normal distribution with appropriate mean and variance.

ln(  )2 2   B2   A2
.
4. Calculate the threshold as r 
2(  A   B )
5. If signal > threshold then decision = A otherwise decision = B.
6. Calculate new β = old β *prob(decision| μB)/ prob(decision| μA)
7. Repeat 3-6 100 times
8. Repeat 1-7 1,000 times
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